The contrasting twin failures of Global Climate Action
The history of over thirty years of climate negotiations is a story of contradictions. Binding commitments have failed, and so have non-binding commitments. Differentiation has collapsed, and non-differentiation has collapsed alongside it. Compliance mechanisms were abandoned, yet non-compliance mechanisms delivered nothing. Carbon credits, once predicted to command a price of $100 per ton, failed before they even shaped the global markets. Even without them, voluntary offsets failed to generate meaningful change. Every pathway—opposed in theory to its predecessor—has led to disappointment.
Yet despite this repeated failure, the world must continue negotiating. Not because the process has worked, but because the cost of abandoning it may be far greater.
The UNFCCC: A bold beginning, a long struggle
Born in 1992 as one of the three Rio Conventions, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was revolutionary for its time, with the objective of preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, to ensure that food production is not threatened and enable sustainable economic development. It introduced the concept of “common but differentiated responsibility,” accepting the reality that while climate change is a global challenge, responsibility for action must be weighed based on historical emissions, capacity, and economic development. The world was divided into Annex 1, comprising developed nations obligated to cut emissions, and Non-Annex 1, consisting of developing nations encouraged to pursue sustainable growth without binding targets.
Kyoto’s promise: Binding targets that failed
The Kyoto Protocol, the first major instrument of the UNFCCC, established globally accepted CO₂-equivalent reduction targets for Annex 1 nations. In theory, the protocol ensured accountability by imposing compliance penalties, with any country missing its target facing deductions imposed on the next cycle of commitments.
Yet Kyoto failed for reasons that became painfully evident by COP-6 in The Hague in 2000, where negotiations collapsed under political deadlock, forcing the world to reassemble at COP-6bis in Bonn in 2001 to salvage the Kyoto Protocol. And so it emerged, half born, half dead, but celebrations were emphatic: multilateralism had triumphed over unilateralism. Long hours that negotiators spent burning midnight oil over weeks was a bit like a symphony playing while the Titanic was sinking. USA, global leader in climate science, walked away, preferring bilateral actions over multilateral constraints. The protocol crumbled. Russia’s surplus emissions, referred to as “hot air,” meant that even countries that remained within Kyoto could meet their targets without reducing real emissions, using this surplus. Markets that were designed to enforce discipline became tools of convenience.
Kyoto died not just because USA exited but because binding commitments exposed contradictions too great to sustain. Compliance mechanisms assumed that strict enforcement would drive progress, but when compliance threatened economic growth, nations diluted mechanisms beyond recognition or simply walked away.
The Bali Roadmap: A moment of hope that led nowhere
At COP-13 in Bali in 2007, the world attempted to revive multilateralism through the Bali Action Plan, which promised a new framework bridging the gap between developed and developing nations. It introduced the idea of voluntary mitigation plans for developing countries, alongside commitments for technology transfer and financial support. There was hope that a global process could balance emission reduction with sustainable development. Yet, despite optimism, Bali’s roadmap never led to binding commitments. The same structural contradictions that plagued Kyoto—finance, differentiation, and enforcement—continued to haunt negotiations.
Copenhagen’s Collapse: The illusion of a breakthrough
By COP-15 in Copenhagen in 2009, expectations were soaring. The world anticipated a legally binding successor to Kyoto, one that would finally produce enforceable global action. Instead, Copenhagen collapsed into chaos, yielding only the Copenhagen Accord—a non-binding political declaration that lacked enforcement, differentiation, or financial guarantees. The failure of Copenhagen was a turning point. It signalled the death of binding climate agreements, paving the way for voluntary pledges that would later define the Paris Agreement.
Durban’s shift toward voluntary commitments
At COP-17 in Durban, South Africa, in 2011, the world formally abandoned the Kyoto model. The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action laid the foundation for a new global agreement, one that would apply to all nations equally—without differentiation, without binding targets, and without compliance mechanisms. By including major developing nations, it blurred historical responsibilities, yet failed to enforce action, cementing a shift toward voluntary commitments that set the stage for Paris’s shortcomings. Durban set the stage for a new era of climate diplomacy, moving significantly away from equilibrium of commitments initially contemplated under the UNFCCC.
Paris Agreement: Non-binding commitments that failed
Having witnessed Kyoto collapse under the weight of binding obligations, the world embraced a voluntary approach with the Paris Agreement in 2015. Differentiation amongst nations in Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1, which remained frozen in time, was abandoned, and all countries committed to targets without legal enforcement. Nations set their own emissions pledges, often presenting business-as-usual scenarios as climate action. And the world celebrated, this time with USA.
The Paris Agreement was celebrated for avoiding the rigidity of Kyoto—there were no compliance penalties, no top-down obligations, and no enforced differentiation. Yet Paris has not delivered, just as Kyoto did not. USA once again walked away in 2017, to join later and walk away again, stripping globalism of yet another foundational participant. Emissions continued to rise, and countries presented long-term climate plans without any direct consequences for inaction. If Kyoto failed because it forced compliance, Paris failed because it removed enforcement entirely.
Negotiations continue, emissions grow
Compounding this failure, global emissions have continued to climb, with total global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and land use change estimated at 40.9 billion tonnes in 2023. Notably, fossil fuel emissions increased by 1.1% from 2022 (Global Carbon Project). China with 31 % and USA with 13% lead. Countries like India with 8% share of global emissions reflect its low per capita emissions (around 2.07 tCO₂ vs. 9.24 tCO₂ for China). Paris’s voluntary pledges, often business-as-usual dressed as ambition, have failed to curb this growth, with UNEP projections estimating a 2.8°C rise by 2100. This relentless rise underscores the disconnect between negotiation rhetoric and reality. Notwithstanding this, almost all Conferences of Parties are considered a success, underlining the politics of climate negotiations. This optics-driven success masks inaction, as negotiators talk while emissions soar.
The collapse of climate markets
Market-based climate solutions crumbled in record time, with near-collapse of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and the decline in global carbon credit transactions. Kyoto’s carbon credits collapsed as soon as buyers stopped seeing them as valuable for image-building. Developing nations, which had fought hard for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), abandoned the principle of using cleaner technologies in favour of immediate economic gains. The initial idea of CDM was to support technologies that led to lower emissions compared to business-as-usual practices, but this too eroded over time.
Markets reacted swiftly. Emission reductions under CDM that were officially assessed to be real and measurable—called Certified Emission Reductions—fell out of favour, and corporations shifted toward Voluntary Emission Reductions, believing that self-regulation offered more credibility than broken compliance markets. In the end, neither delivered real progress.
The mirage of climate finance
The market failure was mirrored by the mirage of climate finance. Pledges of $100 billion annually by 2020, critical for developing nations, fell short, with only $83.3 billion mobilized in 2020, often as mislabelled aid or business-as-usual private sector projects labelled as climate action (OECD). The opaque accounting trust, eroded trust further, particularly for Non-Annex 1 countries reliant on support, highlighting yet another broken promise of global negotiations. Technology transfer and adaptation efforts met a similar fate—underfunded, symbolic, and ultimately ineffective.
Contrasts that lead to the same failure
Kyoto was rigid and failed. Paris was flexible and failed. Differentiation failed. Non-differentiation failed. Compliance failed. Non-compliance failed. Markets failed with a high price on carbon, and markets failed without a price on carbon. With every contradiction leading to failure, the question arises—where does the world go from here?
Why the global process must continue despite failure
The global process must persist, not because it has succeeded, but because it remains the only mechanism that exists. The cost of abandoning multilateral climate negotiations may be greater than the cost of keeping them alive, even in dysfunction.
Without a structured process, the world will revert to fragmented, bilateral agreements, benefiting the powerful nations while leaving smaller states behind. Climate finance, already opaque, will become even more distorted, driven by donor interests rather than genuine emission reductions. The principle of technology transfer and capacity-building, weak as it stands, may vanish entirely, deepening inequality.
Multilateralism may not be perfect, but it forces nations to remain accountable to the global conversation. Abandoning climate negotiations risks opening the door to unchecked national interests, where countries act in isolation, prioritizing competition over sustainability.
Disconnect with 1.5°C/2°C targets
The 1.5°C and 2°C targets were politically grandiose, but scientifically unrealistic. Adopted as compromises (EU’s 1996 2°C goal, 2015’s 1.5°C push by vulnerable nations), they are unattainable—1.1°C warming already brings extreme impacts, like 50.5°C days in a vulnerable South Asian region—yet dominate discourse while emissions soar. With 1.5°C out of reach and 2°C unlikely (UNEP), countries may choose comfort of optics over truthful ambition needed to soothe a warming world. Globally, tropics face 52°C days by 2050 (IPCC), while Antarctica may see liveable zones, yet rising seas threaten millions. Adopting a differentiated ambition framework within an overall global 1.5°C to 2.0°C framework, where nations set tailored targets reflecting differential impacts, vulnerability, and capacity, supported by finance and technology may enhance outcomes. Varying impacts, like extreme heat or rising seas, demand tailored ambition.
A future defined by imperfect continuation
Kyoto collapsed under rigidity. Paris faltered due to leniency. Every approach has collapsed under its own contradictions. And yet, we must continue—not because we expect success, but because failure to negotiate is worse than failure within negotiations. The world cannot afford to abandon climate diplomacy, even when outcomes disappoint. The mere presence of global negotiations keeps the issue alive. Nations may underperform, but at least the conversation forces them to acknowledge their role. Walking away entirely would mean accepting climate injustice, technological monopolization, and global division.
So where does the world move from here? It needs to move forward, knowing that more climate conferences may fail—but recognizing that to abandon them altogether would be an even greater catastrophe.
From Failure to Function: A new paradigm built on real incentives
The world must now move beyond the binary of binding vs. voluntary, of markets vs. regulation, of differentiation vs. sameness. What is needed is not another format of climate agreement but a different foundation of climate action—one that works with the grain of national priorities rather than against it. Three transitions could anchor this new thinking.
Recognizing carbon as a pollutant
By 2027, nations should establish carbon laws setting mandatory CO2 emission limits, guided by UNFCCC benchmarks within a global framework, supported by GCF-funded law development, like biodiversity frameworks. Despite its global nature, carbon emissions remain excluded from most national environmental laws. They are treated as abstractions rather than pollutants, and this has allowed regulatory evasion on a scale unmatched by any other environmental harm. Integrating carbon into domestic legal frameworks—whether through emission limits, reporting requirements, or impact assessments—could make climate action enforceable within countries, not just between them. The shift need not be punitive. Like SO2 limits, CO2 standards can drive compliance, with GCF grants aiding Non-Annex 1 nations’ legal frameworks, as seen in biodiversity strategies. Countries like Denmark have already pioneered such approaches.
Real funds for technology transfer
By 2027, establish a substantial fund, financed by multilateral institutions, governed by recipient nations for technology co-creation. Technology transfer has been promised for decades. But in practice, it has either been symbolic or commercially transactional. What is needed is a dedicated, transparent, and independent fund—not just for access to equipment, but for actual absorption, adaptation, and co-creation of climate technologies in developing countries. This cannot be left to voluntary partnerships. It must be institutionalized with governance that reflects the needs of those who receive, not just those who fund.
Internalize health and lifecycle costs in project finance
By 2028, use multilateral finance to fund a 10% interest rate discount for health-cost ratings. Polluting technologies often appear cheaper because their true costs are delayed and dispersed—borne in future illnesses, degraded air, and depleted ecosystems. A new rating system that estimates the long-term health and environmental costs over a ten-year horizon can radically alter investment behaviour. Even a minor linkage between these ratings and interest rates on climate lending—public or private—could tilt the economic logic in favour of sustainability. This approach does not eliminate profit motives; it realigns them with public welfare.
The Future
When the cost of pollution is invisible, the dirtiest technologies win. When laws cannot regulate carbon, ambition becomes fiction. When technology is monopolized, transitions slow. So where does the world move from here? It may move forward with humility, not celebrations. With policy grounded in reality, not rhetoric. It should recognize that climate negotiations may not always succeed, but also accept that abandoning them is not an option. The global process may not have fixed the climate so far, but now has the experience to do better, by enabling financial rebalancing, and creating entry points for new ideas. Failures have taught us that credible systems must be built on trust and transparency, while factoring in short-termism and realism. The outcomes can still be possibly positive, keeping the possibility of fairness and survival alive.
Disclaimer
Views expressed above are the author’s own.
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